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Summary
The dissertation investigates the character of the historical narrative that is produced at the 
international tribunals. It revolves around the notions of peace and reconciliation, qualified in the 
human rights principle of non-repetition and the potential of international criminal law to contribute 
to these ends. It is held that the collective aspect of the right to truth provides a useful tool, with 
which the potential of the narrative in preventing future crime can be evaluated. 
Following an inquiry into the scope and character of the emerging ‘right to truth’, the construct  of 
truth and history in international criminal trial is described. The dissertation then deploys the ’right 
to truth’ and the thereby provoked question of the relation between a certain account of the past and 
the promise of non-recurrence, to analyse the utility  of the typical narrative produced at the 
international tribunals.  In the final chapter the concept of ideology is utilised to understand the 
project of international criminal justice as intrinsically political.
In the final concluding comment it is held that the emancipatory  potential of the work of the 
international tribunals can be fully realised only when the political character of the judicial account 
of the past is admitted. 
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Sammanfattning
Uppsatsen undersöker de internationella tribunalernas uppfattning om, och beskrivning av, det 
förflutna. Texten rör sig kring begreppen fred och försoning, vilka kvalificeras i människorätts-
principen ‘non-repetition’, eller ‘icke-upprepning’, av tidigare förbrytelser. Denna princip väcker 
frågan om huruvida internationella brottmålsförfaranden kan motverka framtida förbrytelser, genom 
den historieskrivning de bidrar till. 
Inledningsvis presenteras den allt mer omfattande ’rätten till sanning’, dess ursprung, utveckling 
och nutida innebörd. Därpå beskrivs hur det förflutna bearbetas vid de internationella tribunalerna, 
samt hur denna process påverkar karaktären av, och särdragen i, den rättsliga historieskrivning som 
därigenom tar form. I samband med denna beskrivning ifrågasätts påståendet att den ‘sanning’ om 
det förflutna som befästs vid tribunalerna bidrar till att motverka framtida grova förbrytelser. 
’Rätten till sanning’, företrädesvis den kollektiva dimensionen av normen, används som en 
måttstock för denna analys. I det avslutande kapitlet belyses den ideologiska dimensionen av den 
internationella straffrättens historieförståelse. Det framhålls att  ambitionen att  hålla individer 
straffrättsligt ansvariga för vissa särskilt  grova brott är ett politiskt projekt och skall förstås som 
sådant.
Slutligen hävdas att den rättsliga historieskrivningens ideologiska särdrag bör exponeras, för att 
främja den internationella straffrättens preventiva effekt. 
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Abbreviations
Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo      FPLC
International Committee of the Red Cross   ICRC
International Criminal Court    ICC
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda   ICTR
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia  ICTY
The Democratic Republic of the Congo    DRC
The United Nations     UN 
Union des Patriotes Congolais        UPC
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1.	  Introduc7on
1.1.	  On	  the	  ma:er	  of	  truth	  and	  ideology	  in	  interna7onal	  criminal	  law	  
The project of international criminal law is often defended with reference to the potential function 
of the international tribunals and their trials, as conveyors of truth. It is argued that  establishing a 
‘neutral’ historical record promotes peace and reconciliation in societies scourged by conflict and/or 
mass violations of human rights.1 This rhetoric is informed by the transitional justice paradigm: the 
revealing of the truth about the past is considered to be an essential part of any transitional justice 
project.2 Nevertheless, judicial history writing is controversial for several reasons:
•  Fair-trial issues and the need to accommodate the rights of the accused.3
• The danger of conducting politicised trials (so called show-trials).4
• The relatival nature of truth and the controversial relation of truth discovery and peace/
reconciliation.5 
The dissertation will approach this last theme of controversy through three main chapters, each 
necessary  to approach the core question of the dissertation: How does the historical narrative 
conveyed by the international criminal tribunals resonate with the right to truth and the therewith 
associated aim of preventing future crime? 
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1 Milbert Shin Alan Tieger, Plea Agreements in the ICTY, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005). 
Page 670.
2 Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of 
Justice to Reconciliation, 24 Human Rights Quarterly (2002). Pages 586-588. 
3 Daniel Joyce, The Historical Function of International Criminal Trials: Re-thinking International Criminal 
Law, 73 Nordic Journal of International Law (2004). Pages 474-482. 
4 For a fierce case made against conducting a criminal trial for political purposes, see Hannah Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem : a report on the banality of evil   (Penguin Books. 2006 (1963)). Epilogue.
5 Fletcher & Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation. 
1.2.	  Research	  method	  and	  key	  literature:	  a	  deconstruc7ve	  approach	  to	  interna7onal	  
criminal	  law
1.2.1.	  The	  func7on	  of	  the	  trial	  as	  a	  conveyor	  of	  truth
The truth-telling function of the international tribunals and the relevance of the historical narrative 
constructed in their trials has been asserted and celebrated for at least two decades. In her strong 
case made for the duty  to prosecute international crimes, Diane Orentlicher avers the deterrent 
effect associated with ”[l]aying bare the truth”6  about past crimes, in combination with the 
condemnation of such behaviour, in a criminal trial.7  The truth-telling function of the international 
criminal trials has also been commended by prominent transitional justice scholars such as Ruti 
Teitel. Teitel particularly commends the narrative produced at the tribunals, wherein the agency and 
choice of the individual perpetrator is emphasised, for its ability to convey to societies recovering 
from grave and systematic abuses of human rights the possibility  of change.8  These enthusiastic 
voices, asserting the positive effects of judicial history  writing, however find their counterparts in a 
later strain of critical commentators on the promises of international criminal justice. 
Martti Koskenniemi has written on the difficulty of evaluating the functions of international 
criminal justice. He argues that in the light of the uncertain promise of general prevention, as well 
as the hopeless discrepancy that is associated with meeting out a number of years in prison as 
punishment for a crime of the caliber of genocide, it is tempting to consider the discovery of the 
truth about ”[w]hat really happened”9 as a core function of the international criminal trial.10    Yet, 
he notes that legal and historical truths are not seldom at odds with each other, an example of which 
is the over-emphasis of the criminal law paradigm of individual responsibility. Koskenniemi argues 
that the individualisation of criminal guilt that is necessary in criminal law procedures may 
sometimes distort –rather than reveal – the truth.11 
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6 Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 
100 Yale Law Journal (1991). Page 2542. 
7 Id. at. Page 2542. 
8 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice   (Oxford University Press. 2000). Pages 115-117. 
9 Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
(2002). Page 11. 
10 Id. at. Pages 2-11. 
11 Id. at. Pages 14-15. 
Tallgren also delves into the question of the usefulness of international criminal law and the 
international tribunals. She scrutinises the assertion that the punishment of international crime will 
have a deterrent effect, preventing the recurrence of crime, and finds no evidence to negate the 
promise of such an effect, yet cannot find evidence in its favour either.12  As international criminal 
law fails to convince Tallgren of its immediate utility, she finds its real function to lie with its 
symbolism. Tallgren argues that the international criminal trials make comprehensible such crime 
that may in fact not be comprehensible, creating a consoling narrative of guilt  and innocence out of 
a tangled web of circumstances that lead to the commission of the crime.13  Koskenniemi and 
Tallgren share a critical perspective on the way that the narrative produced at the tribunals is 
presented as a neutral account of the past, when to their mind this narrative is political and should 
be problematised as such. Their method is deconstructive, whereby the biases and contradictions of 
international criminal law are exposed. 
The above debate provides the topical as well as methodological inspiration to the dissertation. It is 
questioned what use the truth that is discovered within the walls of the courtroom may be of, 
outside the context of the trial. How does the political character of this narrative influence it’s 
utility? To address this matter, an inquiry into the right to truth provides a useful template, with 
which the character and effect of the truth discovered at the international tribunals can be assessed.
1.2.2.	  Outline
The dissertation comprises of three main chapters. The first  chapter considers the right to truth in 
international law. The second chapter explains how a historical account is constructed in 
international criminal trials. The third chapter utilises the concept of ideology to frame the historical 
narrative produced in a courtroom as political. 
The right to truth is an emerging international norm and much of its scope and implications remain 
to be clarified. The document that provides the most comprehensive account of the right, is the 
2006 ’Study on the Right to Truth’ provided by the Office of the United Nations High 
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12 Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 European Journal of 
International Law (2002). Page 569.
13 Id. at. Pages 593-594. 
Commissioner for Human Rights.14  This study refers to the origins of the norm, as well as to 
contemporary  developments through case law and international custom. The segment of the norm 
that is most thought-provoking, in relation to the utility of the historical narrative produced at  the 
international tribunals, is the collective aspect of the right to truth. This side to the norm is 
mentioned in the study but rather inadequately explained. Nevertheless, drawing on other UN 
documents, such as the 2009 Human Rights Council resolution on the right to truth,15 as well as the 
first report of Pablo de Greiff, Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparations and 
guarantees of non-recurrence,16 it is concluded that the material scope of the collective right to truth 
must be understood in conjunction with the human rights principle of non-repetition. 
The historical narrative that is produced at the international tribunals lacks a comprehensive 
analysis. In the third chapter of this dissertation, it is examined first using a feminist method of 
inquiry  into the political aspects of a seemingly neutral legal paradigm, guided by the article 
’Feminist Approaches to International Law’ by Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley 
Wright. Following this, the influence of the general rules and principles of international criminal 
law, as well as of the procedural rules of the trials, on the historical narrative produced in the 
courtroom is described. Finally, the collective aspect to the right to truth is used to analyse the 
utility of this particular account of the past.  
In the third chapter, Terry  Eagleton’s definition of the notion of ideology, cited from his monograph 
‘Ideology  – An Introduction’, is used as a conceptual framework to understand how international 
criminal justice can be understood as an agent of ideology – and why this may be a problem. This 
chapter aims to provide a progressive perspective on the too rarely  problematised argument that the 
discovery  of the truth of the past will facilitate reconciliation and prevent future violations of human 
rights.
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14 UNHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 
Economic and Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91, 8 February 2006.
15 UNHRC, United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 12/12 Right to the Truth, A/HRC/RES/12/12, 9 
October 2009.
16 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of 
non-recurrence,, A/HRC/21/46, 9 August 2012.
1.2.3.	  A	  cri7cal	  perspec7ve
The inquiry into the process of constructing truth and justice at the international tribunals is inspired 
by the radical perspective of Susan Marks and others who allude to the contemporary relevance of 
Marxism for the review of international law. Marks criticises the blunt understanding of history 
amongst the international legal scholarship, wherein history is perceived as a mass of 
contingencies,17 and summarises her critique in the following manner: 
”I have suggested that, as scholars of law, we tend to give considerable 
attention to vindicating the contingency of history, but rather less 
attention to its necessary, or determined, aspects. As a result, a form of 
‘false contingency’, as I have called it, is left unchallenged, according to 
which the injustices of the present order are made to appear as though 
they were random, accidental and arbitrary. And if they are random, 
accidental and arbitrary, then the prospects of changing them become 
every bit as remote as if they were fated. The category of possibility — 
not just abstract possibility, but real, historical possibility — drops out of 
sight.”18
Applied to the project of international criminal law and the trial business, Marks’ theory compels an 
inquiry  into the process of establishing the truth about the past in this context. An international 
criminal law trial is a vehicle capable of a ’neutral’ intervention in conflict and post-conflict 
societies and is as such a legitimate way  of interfering with sovereignty. A triumph for the global 
human rights movement, as it asserts international human rights standards and delivers justice and 
truth to the affected societies. At the same time the trial can be viewed as an agent of contingency, 
obscuring the view of the determined aspects of the conflicts it was meant to explain and bring an 
element of justice to. Diane Orentlicher argues that courtroom procedures will provide a 
”[c]omprehensive record of past violations.”19  Is this a valid claim? Marks states: ”False 
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17 Susan Marks, False Contingency, 62 Current Legal Problems (2009). Pages 14-16, 20. 
18 Id. at. Page 20. 
19 Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime. Page 
2546, Note 32. 
contingency is generally true so far it goes, but false as to what it excludes; true in what it says but 
false in what it leaves unsaid, in its unarticulated assumptions, implications and effects.”20
The dissertation utilises Marks’ frustration with the international legal scholars’ understanding of 
history, into a review of how the initial understanding of the past as a mass of contingencies may 
work reciprocally with the meting out of justice at the international tribunals. The suspicion being 
that our comprehension of history shapes law and law recreates our understanding of history. 
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20 Marks, False Contingency. Page 17. 
2.	  The	  right	  to	  truth
2.1.	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  right	  to	  truth
The process of discovering the truth about the past has been given notable weight and significance 
in the transitional justice paradigm. However, while the discovery of the truth is commonly 
interpreted as an agent for peace and reconciliation,21  it can presently  be held that the right to truth 
has gained legal status, rendering it  important beyond its use. In 2006 the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a ’Study on the right to the truth’.22  In 
conclusion, the study holds that the right to the truth requires that States conduct investigations into 
past, grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It claims that the norm is 
an unalienable, non-derogable human right. The Study further contends that this right has both 
individual and societal dimensions and relates to the duty of the State to safeguard human rights and 
provide effective remedies to human rights abuses.23 
	   2.1.1.	  The	  codiﬁed	  right	  to	  truth
In the 2006 Study on the right to truth, the norm is noted to trace its establishment back to the laws 
of armed conflict. As such it originally  referred to the right of families to know of the fate of their 
relatives, as well as the duty of belligerents to search for missing persons.24 The specific legal rule 
cited is codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which provides the legal right 
for relatives of missing persons to know the fate of their kin.25  This right  is applicable in 
international as well as non-international armed conflict.26 In a process of norm evolution spanning 
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21 Alexander L. Boraine, Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation, 60 Journal of International Affairs 
(2006). Page 23.; Yasmin Naqvi, The right to the truth in international law: fact or fiction?, 88 International 
Review of the Red Cross (2006). Pages 262-263. 
22 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and 
Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91.
23 Id. at. Summary.
24 Id. at. Paragraph 5. 
25 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Articles 32-33. 
26 International Committee of the Red Cross: Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, Volume I, Rules   (Cambridge University Press. 2005). Rule 117. Note that 
Additional Protocol I is applicable to international armed conflict only. The mirroring right in non-international 
armed conflict is of customary character. 
over three decades, the right to truth has recently  been asserted once again in an international treaty, 
namely the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
of 2006.27  The Convention holds that ”[e]ach victim has the right to know the truth regarding the 
circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the 
fate of the disappeared person”28.
The codified assertions of the right to truth referred to above do however not depict the full bodied 
scope of the right, as already indicated in the brief account of the Study  performed by the Office of 
the Human Rights Commissioner. The right to truth currently  vastly  transcends the contexts of 
armed conflict or cases of enforced disappearances, and considers individual victims, as well as 
whole societies as right-bearers. As such it  has been explained in numerous UN documents and 
reports, in case-law, in the work of truth-commissions and in scholarly reviews.  
	   2.1.2.	  Indica7ons	  of	  a	  customary	  right	  to	  truth
Customary  international law emanates from coherent, consistent State practice and a therewith 
related belief on behalf of the State that the practice is compelled by a legal obligation.29   The 
interpretation given on the right to truth by  various human rights organs within the UN, by the 
General Assembly even, indicates that such a custom has developed regarding the right. This 
custom places a far-reaching obligation on the state to seek and provide truth to victims of 
particularly grave crime, which overlaps with and exceeds the codified norm. 
In 2005, the ’Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through 
action to combat impunity’30 (hereinafter ‘updated set of principles’), reasserted the findings of the 
1997 report ‘The administration of justice and the human rights of detainees: question of impunity 
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27 The convention entered into force on 23 December 2010, following the 20th ratification of the treaty.
28 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 December 
2006 . Article 24(2). 
29 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946. Article 38(1)(b). 
30 UNCHR, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Updated Set of principles for the protection and 
promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005.
of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political)’31. The first principle of the earlier 
document, confirmed by the second principle of the latter, declares every peoples’ inalienable right 
to the truth about gross violations of human rights – their perpetration and the circumstances that 
caused them. The disclosure of past events is said to be ”[e]ssential to avoid any recurrence of 
violations in the future”.32  This collective right to truth is complemented in both sets of principles 
by the individual victim’s right to truth – qualified as a matter of families ’right to know’ about their 
relatives fate, similar to the codified version of the right to truth.33 
Considering the sparse exposition on the right to truth provided in the above mentioned 
documents,34  the 2006 ’Study on the right to truth’ provided a much needed clarification on the 
evolution and content of the international norm. The Study reiterates how the obligations of the 
Geneva Conventions were extensively interpreted by the Inter American Commission on Human 
Rights, in the context of the systematic practice of enforced disappearance performed by the 
military juntas of Latin America. It states that the work of the Inter American Commission, 
alongside the efforts of human rights activists in the affected countries, lead to the development of a 
doctrine of a right to truth in case law considering enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings 
and torture.35 
In outlining the views taken by various UN bodies on the scope and function of the right  to truth, 
the 2006 Study on the right to truth highlights the above mentioned standpoint of the updated set of 
principles of 2005, on the disclosure of truth as a mainstay to combat impunity. The General 
Assembly resolution 60/147 ’Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
 
15
31 UNCHR, United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, The administration of justice and the human rights of detainees: question of 
impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political), Annex II. , E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.
1, 2 October 1997.
32 Id. at. Principle 1: the inalienable right to truth.; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Updated 
Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, E/CN.
4/2005/102/Add.1. Principle 2: the inalienable right to truth.
33 Id. at. Principle 4: the victims’ right to know.; United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The administration of justice and 
the human rights of detainees: question of impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and 
political), Annex II. , E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1. Principle 3: the victims’ right to know. 
34 Ultimately providing guidance to the nations on how, and why, they should combat impunity.
35 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and 
Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91. Paragraph 8. 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ is furthermore considered, wherein the public 
disclosure of the truth is regarded as an element of reparation and satisfaction for a victim of such 
violations.36
The work and legacy of truth commissions is also referred to by the Study as having developed and 
consolidated the right to truth. It particularly draws attention to the truth commissions of El 
Salvador and Sierra Leone, which explicitly referred to the right as a legal basis for their work.37 
Indeed even without such reference, the common practice of installing truth commissions as a way 
to further societal reconciliation, to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, in countries where 
human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law had been systematic and 
widespread, is considered to have contributed to the development of the norm.38 
Lastly, the Study alludes to case law emanating primarily from South American courts asserting the 
right to truth in cases of gross violations of human rights. Notably, it cites the truth trials of 
Argentina, wherein the right to truth in relation to enforced disappearances is considered to be 
based on the right to mourning, as well as on the right to justice, and is considered instrumental to 
”[i]ndividual and societal healing and the prevention of future violations”39
The solidity and coherence of the state practice referenced, indicating an international customary 
norm providing a right to truth can indeed be questioned. Yasmin Naqvi points out  that states often 
show little interest to disclose the truth about human rights violations committed by their own 
government. She particularly notes that the common practice of granting amnesty for past crimes in 
the aftermath of internal conflicts, appears to run contrary to the right.40  Her critique 
notwithstanding, Naqvi finally accepts that the right to truth may  at least be considered as an 
emerging customary international norm, albeit with ”[d]iffering contours”41. 
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36 Id. at. Paragraph 9. 
37 Id. at. Paragraph 14. 
38 Id. at. Paragraphs 13-15. 
39 Id. at. Paragraph 23. 
40 Naqvi, The right to the truth in international law: fact or fiction? Page 267. 
41 Id. at. Page 267. 
It certainly goes beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate in depth the legal status of the 
right to truth. While it can be questioned as a fully  solidified norm, it can also be defended. It is 
worth mentioning that subsequent to Naqvi’s comments, the General Assembly has proclaimed 
March 24th to be the ’International Day for the Right to the Truth concerning Gross Human Rights 
Violations and for the Dignity of Victims’.42  The UN Human Rights Council has also appointed a 
‘Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-
recurrence’43, following several resolutions by the Council on transitional justice and the right to 
truth.44 The relevant question considering the norm is thus arguably not whether it  exists, but what it 
in fact stipulates. 
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42 UN General Assembly, Resolution 65/196, Proclamation of 24 March as the International Day for the Right 
to Truth concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims, A/RES/65/196, 3 March 
2011. 
43 UNHRC, Resolution 18/7, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of truth, justice, reparations and 
guarantees of non-recurrence, A/HRC/18/L.22, 29 September 2011.
44 Most prominent amongst them: United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 12/12 Right to the Truth, 
A/HRC/RES/12/12.
2.2.	  What	  truth?	  The	  issue	  of	  qualifying	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  right
”The right to the truth implies knowing the full and complete truth as to the 
events that transpired, their specific circumstances, and who participated in 
them, including knowing the circumstances in which the violations took 
place, as well as the reasons for them”45
	   2.2.1.	  Truth	  and	  reconcilia7on	  in	  the	  transi7onal	  jus7ce	  paradigm:	  providing	  a	  conceptual	  
framework	  for	  the	  right	  to	  truth
Before continuing to a more detailed analysis of the content of the right to truth it is necessary to 
linger somewhat on the concept of transitional justice, which arguably  provides the conceptual 
framework in which the content of the ’right to truth’ has expanded in scope.46  It  is noted above that 
transitional justice mechanisms, such as trials and truth-commissions, addressing grave violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law are considered to have shaped and solidified the 
norm. Notably, the notion that truth-seeking promotes societal healing and prevents future 
violations makes a cogent match with the functional definition of ‘transitional justice’ proclaimed 
by the Secretary-General to the UN:
”[t]he full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may 
include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of 
international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof.”47 
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Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91. Paragraph 3. 
46 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 12/12 Right to the Truth, A/HRC/RES/12/12. 
Parapgraphs 1-2. 
47 United Nations Security Council, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004. Paragraph 8. 
The Secretary-General thus asserts the importance of investigating past abuse and grievance so as to 
promote peace and reconciliation for the future. It  follows that transitional justice mechanisms 
should be perceived as simultaneously backward-looking and forward-looking, and it  is easy to see 
how this duality has influenced the scope of the right to truth. 
The dual function of transitional justice mechanisms is indeed advocated by Pablo de Greiff, 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence, 
who released his first  report in August 2012.48  In addressing the foundations of his mandate, de 
Greiff states that his task is to focus on situations of grave violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law.49  In promoting measures which would bring elements of truth, 
justice, reparations and of non-recurrence to societies affected by such crimes,50  the work of the 
Special Rapporteur is meant to prevent the recurrence of violations and promote reconciliation.51 
While noting that the Human Rights Council has spelled out the sought-after measures as grounded 
in international obligations incumbent on states (such as the internationally recognized right to 
truth), the Rapporteur suggests that  these legal obligations are best understood in relation to the 
ends that they  are supposed to meet (a functional analysis).52  This is not a wholly  straightforward 
matter, however. If the right to truth is most accurately  understood in the light of its purported 
functions (such as societal healing and the prevention of future crimes), then an inquiry into the 
legal obligation demands account to case-specific circumstances, as well as to general theories of 
peace and reconciliation; not at all an apolitical endeavor.
	   2.2.2.	  Why	  truth?	  Soothing	  individual	  tragedy	  or	  reconciling	  a	  troubled	  society?
The legal foundation to the right to truth is fragmented. No single treaty defines the full scope of the 
right as it has evolved in case law, state practice and treaty law over the course of more than three 
decades. Because of this, the norm now appears as a merger between the principle of families right 
to know about the grievances of their kin and the right of a people to know the circumstances of, 
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48 UNHRC, United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, A/HRC/21/46, 9 August 2012. 
49 Id. at. Paragraph 10. 
50 Id. at. Paragraph 10. 
51 Id. at. Paragraph 12. 
52 Id. at. Paragraph 21. 
and causes for, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law amongst them.53 
Given that ”[t]ruth is relative to present interest”54, and that the material scope of the right  to truth 
is best understood in the light of the purported functions of the norm, this merger, while 
thematically cohesive, obscures the dissimilar character of the obligation to, for example, reveal the 
truth to the family of a torture victim, compared to the obligation to reveal the truth about the 
systematic practices of torture of an oppressive regime to a whole nation. 
It is thus argued that the pre-requisite to the right – a single case of an enforced disappearance or 
grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law, will shape the material scope of 
the norm. In the context  of an individual right-holder, say a mother of a person subjected to an 
enforced disappearance, the substance of the right is thus fairly unequivocal: the mother has a right 
to know the whereabouts of her child, whether her child is alive, the reasons for the disappearance 
and so forth.55  In the context of a collective right to truth, the content of the right is not equally 
unambiguous.
What is the suggested function of providing a society  with ‘the truth’ about past  crimes? The 
collective right to truth implies that in particular circumstances of serious human rights violations, 
or where international humanitarian law has been grossly  violated, society as a whole has a right to 
know about the”[c]auses and conditions pertaining to [these] gross violations” 56 , due to the 
collective dimension of victimhood that arises in the face of such crimes.57  To this end it can be 
argued that the collective dimension of the right to truth demands reparations, more specifically 
satisfaction to the victimized collective, in the form of a”[v]erification of the facts and full and 
public disclosure of the truth”58. This conclusion should have implications on any project of truth 
and justice in the aftermath of mass atrocities and the like. It does not only demand that the truth 
about the crimes be sought after, but also that it be adequately and publicly proclaimed. 
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Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91. Paragraph 38. 
54 Naqvi, The right to the truth in international law: fact or fiction? Page 251. 
55 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and 
Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91.Paragraphs 35 and 38. 
56 Id. at. Paragraph 38. 
57 Id. at. Paragraph 38.
58 UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/147 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, Annex, A/RES/60/147, 21 March 2006. Principle 22(b). 
Beyond recognizing the collective dimension of victimhood (a backward-looking perspective on the 
right), the collective aspect of the right to truth arguably also recognizes the importance of 
knowledge and awareness of the past for a society aiming at a better future. In its 2009 resolution 
12/12 ’The right to truth’, the Human Rights Council ”[r]ecognizes the importance of respecting 
and ensuring the right to the truth so as to contribute to ending impunity and to promote and 
protect human rights”59. The Resolution demonstrates the view of the Council on the right to truth 
as important for instrumental reasons; the implementation of the right is intended to contribute to 
the realisation of other rights, as well as to combat impunity for human rights offenders. How, then, 
is the right to truth meant to further these reiterated functions of the norm? Considering the goal of 
the protection and promotion of other human rights, an indication is provided by the 2006 ’Study  on 
the right to truth’, when read in the light of the core human rights principle of non-repetition: 
”[s]ociety has the right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous 
crimes, as well as the circumstances and the reasons for which aberrant crimes came to be 
committed, so that such events do not reoccur in the future.”60 
 
2.2.3.	  The	  promise	  of	  non-­‐repe77on
”Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events 
concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances 
and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the 
perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the 
truth provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations.”61
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1. 
60 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and 
Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91. Paragraph 58. Emphasis added. 
61 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion 
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The promise of non-repetition lies at the core of the State’s obligation to protect and promote 
human rights.62 It is also a basic principle of any transitional justice initiative: future violations must 
be prevented.63  Just as it is held that victims of gross violations of international human rights law 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law are entitled to the truth about the facts and 
circumstances pertaining to the crime, it is argued that the State is under the obligation to provide 
victims of human rights violations with guarantees of non-repetition.64  To this end the right  to truth 
has a twofold potential to contribute: the public investigation of past atrocities may have a cathartic 
effect and bring an element of closure to the affected victims, their families, and to the surrounding 
society.65  A circle of social insecurity  and vengeance may thus be broken. The sentiment of the 
principle of non-repetition read in conjunction with the right to truth is nonetheless not confined to 
societal healing. Rather, as will be suggested below, when investigations into the past  disclose not 
only facts about specific cases of violations, but also the overarching circumstances and causes of 
grave crime (such as patterns of oppression and violence), the affected society  is enabled to 
effectively ensure the non-repetition of the crimes.
General examples of mechanisms designed to guarantee the non-repetition of violations comprise of 
efforts to strengthen the independence of the judiciary or ensuring civilian control over the armed 
forces of a nation.66  It  is interesting to note, however, that when considering case law concerning 
laws granting amnesties for government officials and belligerents in post-Pinochet Chile and in El 
Salvador after the civil war,  the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has indicated that a 
nations right to truth correlates with the duty of the State to ensure rights for the future.67  In this 
context, a society’s right to truth has been defined as a “collective right which allows a society to 
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63 Patrick Burgess, A new approach to restorative justice – East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process, 
in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (Eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & 
Javier Mariezcurrena ed. 2006). Page 176. 
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Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, Annex, A/RES/60/147. Annex, Principle 23. 
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Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, Annex, A/RES/60/147. Principles 23(a)(c). 
67 .  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Right to the Truth, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
expression/showarticle.asp?artID=156&lID=1, Accessed 03 January 2013
gain access to information essential to the development of democratic systems”68. It follows that  in 
the view of the Commission, amnesty-laws protecting perpetrators of grave violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law from prosecution run contrary  to the obligation of non-
repetition, due to the effective bar it sets on a nations right to truth.  
In accordance with the initial suggestion that the material scope of the right to truth is best 
understood in the light of its purported functions, the appreciation of the collective right to truth as 
intricately  related to the principle of non-repetition must guide the interpretation of the norm to this 
end. The collective right to truth can thus be considered to require such information about past 
crimes, so that the collective may learn from the past  and is enabled to shape a better future.69 
Arguably, this view is shared by  the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as indicated by  the 
above quoted section of the 2006 study on the right to truth,70  as well as by the UN Human Rights 
Council71  and its predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights.72  Enter the controversy of 
what aspects of the past need to be revealed to satisfy  the collective right  to truth, with the aim of 
informing a people of issues that need to be addressed, so as to prevent the recurrence of crime. 
Having concluded that the material scope of the collective right to truth is relative to the interest of 
achieving societal reconciliation and prevent future crime, the conflict within the lines of 
transitional justice scholars is directly relevant to the interpretation of the right to truth. 
Louise Arbour distinguishes between two different perspectives on the main business of transitional 
justice: one identifies the paradigm to mainly deal with direct and flagrant violations of 
international human rights law (with a bias towards civil and political rights)73  and international 
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García Funes, Andrés Hernández Carpio, Jose Catalino Meléndez y Carlos Antonio Martínez,  (Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights). Paragraph 151. 
69 Id. at. Paragraph 153. 
70 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and 
Social Council, Study on the right to the truth, E/CN./2006/91. Paragraph 58.
71 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 12/12 Right to the Truth, A/HRC/RES/12/12. Paragraph 
1.
72 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion 
of human rights through action to combat impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. Principle 2: the inalienable right 
to truth.
73 Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for societies in Transition, 40 Journal of International Law and 
Politics (2007). Page 9. 
humanitarian law. The other advocates for transitional justice mechanisms to also focus on 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as to approach broader societal issues. Out 
of the two, Arbour argues that the ‘mainstream’ transitional justice paradigm is geared towards the 
former, as it  traces its roots back to the Nuremberg tribunal and the criminal law paradigm.74 Arbour 
however advocates a more comprehensive definition of the concept, where a transitional justice 
measure ideally also addresses root-causes to systematic violence and other large-scale abuses of 
human rights.75  To the mind of Arbour, these root causes often comprise of social and economic 
injustices, which must be revealed and confronted to achieve reconciliation and true societal 
transition, in order to prevent the reoccurrence of past abuses.76 
Noting that the transitional justice paradigm is motivated by the motto coined by the Argentinian 
truth-commission’s report Nunca Más – ’never again’,77  Lisa J Laplante makes a case similar to 
Arbour’s, and criticizes the way that ‘conventional’ transitional justice mechanisms such as truth 
commissions have not sufficiently examined the root-causes of conflicts - thus providing 
”[u]ncertain guarantees of non-repetition”78. The reservations of Laplante and Arbour as to the 
usefulness of transitional justice initiatives that systematically  disregards social and economical 
issues are shared by the ’Analytical study  on human rights and transitional justice’ provided by the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2009, wherein it is said that ”[p]eace and 
reconciliation demand comprehensive societal transformation that must embrace a broad notion of 
justice, addressing the root causes of conflict and the related violations of all rights”.79
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2.2.4.	  	  Who’s	  duty?	  
It is the duty of the State to ”[e]nsure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations”80. It 
follows that it is the duty of the State to introduce such procedural and institutional mechanisms that 
are required to reveal the truth about past crimes. Consequently, whereas the Study  on the right to 
truth considers the international tribunals to be truth-seeking bodies contributing to the aim of truth-
discovery,81 the tribunals themselves are not duty bound to provide information about past crimes to 
affected societies. One may rather consider the support and cooperation of a state with the 
international court as a way  of ensuring the individual and collective right to truth. Dermot Groome 
argues along these lines and particularly alludes to the possibility that human rights bodies may 
demand State parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to either investigate or 
refer cases to the ICC in the interest of revealing the truth about past crimes.82  
 
2.2.5.	  The	  right	  to	  truth	  in	  a	  nutshell
From the above exposition, the conclusion can be drawn that the right to truth is a fragmented legal 
norm, tending to the needs of individuals as well as of collectives to know the truth about the 
commission of grave crimes. It can be argued that the scope of the right is best understood by way 
of a functional interpretation of the norm. However, the purported functions of the right to truth 
differ depending whether the right-holder is an individual victim or a whole society. 
The collective right to truth arguably aims to provide satisfaction to a victimised collective, to end 
impunity and to contribute to the realisation of other rights. To this end it is held that the function of 
the collective right to truth is best understood in correlation with the duty of the State to provide 
guarantees of the non-recurrence of human rights violations. Such information about past crimes 
must be revealed, that will enable a society scourged by violence and injustice to create a better 
future. 
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of States to take effective action to combat impunity. 
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3.	  The	  construct	  of	  truth	  and	  history	  in	  interna7onal	  criminal	  trials
It must be said that the right to truth and its demands on states to investigate and reveal the truth 
about certain crimes cannot be used as a ’checklist’ to evaluate the practices of the international 
tribunals. Criminal law has ways of its own, to paraphrase Arendt. However, the close connection 
between international criminal law and the transitional justice paradigm – wherein criminal 
prosecutions play a significant role, encourages an inquiry into whether international criminal 
justice indeed contributes to justice, accountability  and reconciliation. In this dissertation this 
inquiry is conducted with the right to truth as a point of reference.
As already mentioned, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights considers 
international criminal trials to be potentially useful mechanisms in providing for the right to truth.83 
The principle that a people has the right to know the truth about the perpetration of grave and 
systematic crimes clearly overlaps with the mandate of the courts to investigate crimes of this 
particular character and caliber. Thus, whilst the international tribunals are not legally responsible 
for providing the truth about past  crimes to victims and affected societies, the emerging 
international norm provides a much needed template against which the fact-finding and truth-telling 
function of the courts can be evaluated. 
Mirroring different aspects of the human rights principle of non-repetition, are the commonly 
reiterated goals of international criminal law: general prevention or deterrence, collective 
reconciliation, peace and security.84  Can these goals be furthered by  the truth-discovery and 
narration of the past that takes place at the tribunals? The following chapter represents an attempt to 
map out the construct of history  at the international tribunals, exploring the legal framework, the 
legal process and the understanding of history that shapes the trial itself.
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2007. Paragraph 82. 
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3.1.The	  interna7onal	  tribunals	  provide	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  past	  –	  incidental	  eﬀect	  or	  key	  
to	  the	  legi7macy	  of	  interna7onal	  criminal	  jus7ce?
”While everybody is busy with it, does one really know what to do with 
international criminal justice? And why?”85
Why should the international community invest time and money on conducting international 
criminal trials? This question has been answered in different ways above. Yet it appears that there is 
no one, conclusive, answer. The utility  of international trials in revealing the truth – the topic of this 
piece of research – has been both applauded and questioned, because history is contentious and the 
criminal trial is restricted and biased in its process of constructing a narrative about the past.
A glance at the historical review of the judicial dealing with the truth about the Holocaust provides 
a good example of this: while the Nuremberg trial promised to reveal the truth about the atrocious 
policies of Nazi Germany,86  later historical reviews of the Nuremberg trials, question the downplay 
of the Holocaust in the indictments.87  Yet the very response by the Israeli government to 
Nuremberg’s failure to adequately address the Holocaust is criticized on its part by Hannah Arendt, 
for lapsing into the conduct of a ‘show trial’.  In ’Eichmann in Jerusalem : a report on the banality 
of evil’, Arendt questions all attempts by the prosecutor to educate the people of Israel, and indeed 
the world, about  the persecution of the Jews by the means of the Eichmann trial. To the mind of 
Arendt, criminal justice busies itself with individual guilt or innocence, and should not be used as a 
theatre for nation-building and history-writing, as any such dramaturgical strategy would impair the 
weight and relevance of the judgement itself.88 
In common law systems, and essentially in civil law jurisdictions as well, the comprehensive ‘truth’ 
about past occurrences is a by-product to a proceeding that primarily revolves around presenting 
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www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/opening-
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87 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials. Pages 21-22. 
88 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem : a report on the banality of evil. Page 253. 
and refuting evidence concerning individual criminal guilt or innocence.89  In the international 
criminal law paradigm, this by-product has nevertheless been given an exceedingly exalted position 
when the legitimacy of the international tribunals is debated. Given that the conduct of these trials 
does not  solely aim to determine individual guilt or innocence, but also to restore peace and aid 
reconciliation, the discovery of a historical truth about the past (considered an important element to 
achieve these aims) has been propelled into the centre of the debate on the international criminal 
justice project.90 The revelation of the truth by the means of trials is thus not only considered a great 
achievement per se, but is also celebrated because of its potentially significant peace building 
effects.91 
Reconciliation is a troubling concept, as it  is difficult  to define and quantify. When is a society 
reconciled? Peace is also a contentious term,92  and so in the following, these broad notions will be 
considered to be represented in the above described human rights principle of non-repetition. When 
in the final section of this chapter the narrative produced at the international tribunals is compared 
to the ideals of the collective right to truth, the main question will consequently  be: what potential 
does the truth that is discovered and established in the name of international criminal justice have to 
further the principle of non-repetition and thus prevent future crime? 
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3.2.	  A	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  interna7onal	  tribunals	  and	  their	  respec7ve	  raison	  d’être	  
3.2.1.	  The	  Interna7onal	  Military	  Tribunal	  SiSng	  at	  Nuremberg	  Germany
In accordance with the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg was set up by the victorious Allies after the Second World War, to try German war 
criminals on counts of war crimes, crimes against  humanity  and crimes against peace.93 It has been 
argued that the Nuremberg trial was a mere extension of the war and indeed, the tone and wording 
of the Nuremberg Charter does not suggest  a reconciliatory function of the trial. Rather, it  seems 
that the justice to be done in Nuremberg was intended to be of a retributive character.94  Yet the 
American Chief Prosecutor to the tribunal, Justice Robert H. Jackson, concluded in his opening 
speech that the trials were to discover and establish ”undeniable proofs of incredible events”95, 
possibly an acknowledgment of the historical function of the trial.
3.2.2.	  The	  UN	  and	  the	  project	  of	  peace	  and	  interna7onal	  criminal	  jus7ce	  aWer	  the	  cold	  
war	  –	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  ﬁrst	  ad	  hoc	  tribunals
The early 1990s saw an invigorated Security Council interpret anew its mandate and 
responsibilities. In declaring the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia as a threat to 
international peace and security,96  the Security Council provided itself with the legal right (under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter) to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).97  Shortly  thereafter, the genocide in Rwanda provoked a similar reaction from 
the Security Council and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up.98 Both 
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of the tribunals were provided with jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide (albeit with some minor definitional variations in their respective statutes).99  If the ideals 
of peace, restoration and reconciliation are distinctly lacking in the statute of the Nuremberg 
tribunal, this is not the case in the UN Security Council Resolutions considering the establishment 
of the ad hoc tribunals. In these documents, matters of peace, restoration and reconciliation are 
expressly associated with the criminal law proceedings.100 
In Antonio Cassese’s analysis of this development of international criminal law, this paradigmatic 
change is ascribed to the influence of the human rights movement, which considered criminal 
accountability as a tool of ensuring compliance with international human rights norms.101   Cassese 
argues that  the trials conducted at the ICTY and the ICTR were meant to contribute to local peace 
building whilst having a globally  deterrent  effect on the potential commission of similar crimes.102 
William Schabas’ account of the diplomatic efforts and UN initiatives leading up  to the creation of 
the ICTY however also alludes to the notion of retribution – the idea that it  is imperative to punish 
perpetrators of war crimes and ethnic cleansing – as having been a driving force in the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals.103 
Apart from the ICTR and the ICTY the Security Council has provided for two other ad hoc 
tribunals: the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). 
Alongside the ad hocs, a number of so-called hybrid courts – essentially national courts with 
international support, sometimes applying international law, have also been set up.  
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3.2.3.	  The	  Interna7onal	  Criminal	  Court	  
Whereas the idea of a permanent international criminal court  had gained momentum after the 
successful establishment and work of the ICTY and the ICTR,104  it was not a novel notion of any 
kind. Already following the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948, the General Assembly  of 
the UN had called for preparations to be made to establish an international court with jurisdiction 
over the crime of genocide.105 Shortly  after, the General Assembly  initiated the process of drafting a 
statute for an international criminal court.106  The political reality  of the Cold War however 
prevented any progress.107 
In 1996, following a number of attempts to draft a statute for a permanent international criminal 
court, the Security  Council set up a ‘Preparatory Committee on the Establishment on an 
International Criminal Court’ (PrepCom). The work of the PrepCom culminated in the Rome 
Conference of 1998 and its multilateral agreement on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (the Rome Statute).108  The court  was provided with jurisdiction over war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression.109 Several novel features compared 
to the legal frameworks of the ad hoc tribunals were introduced in the Statute, notably: 
• The International Criminal Court may exercise jurisdiction only over crimes committed on 
the territory  of a Party to the Rome Statute, or over a crime committed by the national of a 
State Party.110  Jurisdiction may  alternatively be exercised in the case of a Security  Council 
referral of a ‘situation’ to the Court.111 
• The International Criminal Court operates under the principle of complementarity, where a 
case is not admissible if it  can be shown that the case is already being investigated by a state 
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which has jurisdiction over it, alternatively has already been investigated and dismissed by 
such a state – provided that the decision not to prosecute is not  the result of the state being 
unable or unwilling to do so.112 
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3.3.	  The	  poli7cs	  of	  interna7onal	  criminal	  law	  
In Gerhard Werle’s account of the historical evolution of international criminal law he refers to the 
establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal as the ‘Breakthrough’, the institution of the ad hocs as the 
‘Renaissance’ and of the ICC as the ‘Consolidation’.113  Understanding that the courts themselves 
where created in very  different contexts and for various reasons, it is necessary to ask: the 
consolidation of what? What ideals have been consolidated into the law of the celebrated project of 
international criminal justice? 
”A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic system, 
for example, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, and is 
thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and 
objectivity. These attributes are held to give the law its special authority. 
More radical theories have challenged this abstract rationalism, arguing 
that legal analysis cannot be separated from the political, economic, 
historical and cultural context in which people live. Some theorists argue 
that the law functions as a system of beliefs that make social, political and 
economic inequalities appear natural.”114
The quote is taken from the introduction to a groundbreaking article proposing a feminist approach 
to international law over 20 years ago. The point being, bluntly  speaking, that the proof is in the 
pudding: whatever claim international law may have to neutrality  and objectivity can be contested 
by viewing the law itself through a contextual lens – which will expose it as highly  political and 
biased. Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright focus on the systematic subordination of women that is 
represented in, and reproduced by, international law. The method of challenging the neutrality of 
international law as a whole by calling into question its focus, biases, and exclusions (in relation to 
the context of which it  operates) is however also a potent way to expose the character and politics 
of any of its fragments. 
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Above, it has been established that tribunals and trials have been created and used for different 
purposes in different contexts. Whether the intention be to punish ones enemies, to bring peace to 
war-torn societies or to establish and enforce basic human rights, international intervention by 
‘law’ and criminal law trials carries great legitimacy. It  has a flair of neutrality and fairness, as 
opposed to the connotations of politics and real-political power of other intervention tools, such as 
economic sanctions and certainly  of armed interventions. However, as noted by Charlesworth, 
Chinkin and Wright: what is neutral on paper is not necessarily  neutral when read in its context or 
analysed as to its effects.115 
The purpose of the dissertation is to examine the construct of truth and history at the international 
tribunals. Whereas section 3.4. will deal with certain legal principles and rules relating to the 
practical process of discovering and presenting the truth in international criminal trials, the present 
section will focus on the political nature of international criminal law. The same politics that 
influence the paradigm as a whole will also decide the shape and character of the truth that is 
discovered by its trials. 
The following elaboration does not purport to provide a conclusive analysis of the ideologies and 
values shaping the trajectory of international criminal justice. It aims to allude to three 
characteristics of international criminal law which reveal the law’s preconception of history. In 
brief, three features will be considered: 1) International criminal law focuses on militarised and 
state orchestrated violence. 2) It adheres to the private/public dichotomy of international law. 3) The 
paradigm of international criminal law is informed by the liberalist idea of the individualisation of 
criminal guilt. 
3.3.1.	  The	  focus	  on	  militarised	  violence
When Antonio Cassese sums up the characteristic elements of international crimes, he asserts that 
these crimes are all violations of international custom. The customary rules on their part exist so as 
to protect values “[c]onsidered important by the whole international community […] not 
propounded by scholars or starry-eyed philosophers”116. Cassese furthermore states that it lies in 
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the interest of all people that these crimes be repressed.117  This is indeed a claim to universal 
relevance of international criminal justice, a claim which echoes the preamble to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: ”[t]he most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished[...]”118. 
The Rome Statute allows for the jurisdiction of the court  over four categories of crimes: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.119  Other acts have indeed been 
considered to be ‘international crimes’, such as piracy, terrorism and torture (as its own 
category).120  The four crimes of the Rome Statute, apart from arguably sharing the elements 
proposed by Cassese, also share the common feature of either consisting of military violence (i.e. 
acts carried out by belligerent parties to armed conflicts), or being state- or mass-orchestrated 
violence/violations of human rights.121 
The focus on this type of violence however fails to frame other delict behaviour, such as private 
corporate practices causing major harm, as outrageous enough to be considered an ‘international 
crime’ – even when there is significant harm done and an obvious international element to the 
liability issue. Thus when the Niger Delta is so severely polluted by oil spills that it will take 
decades to clean up, the victims whose livelihood is threatened, arguing that Royal Dutch Shell is 
responsible for the pollution, must seek redress in a civil court in the Hague instead of giving 
testimony at the International Criminal Court in the same city.122 Tallgren critically notes that in the 
process of including some acts under the jurisdiction of the international tribunals and excluding 
others, certain ‘wrongs’ are naturalised and excluded from the possibility of judicial intervention 
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and political debate.123 In this perspective a certain humility is called for. International criminal law 
may target some reprehensible behaviour that it is in the interest of all humanity to repress. The case 
can however be made that the legal paradigm does not address all such behaviour, leaving blank 
pages in its protocols, with harm unaddressed. 
3.3.2.	  The	  private/public	  dichotomy
The private/public dichotomy is a recurring theme of feminist critique on international law. The 
criticism addresses the artificial distinction made between a public sphere and a private sphere of 
the lives of men and women, where the law is primarily concerned with the former. Charlesworth, 
Chinkin and Wright argue that this distinction is artificial and pushes many daily grievances of 
women into a sphere that is left unregulated by  international law, 124  thus re-asserting ”[m]ale 
dominance in the international legal order”125.
 
International criminal law adheres to this same distinction, focusing on the repression and redress of 
harm that takes place in the public realm – rather than on harm that has taken place in the private 
sphere. Whereas for instance the category of war crimes regulate violence in the public sphere, 
prohibiting among other things the targeting of civilians in military attacks,126 it  does not attempt to 
address the general vulnerability of civilians living in a conflict area. The humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur, now labelled a genocide by the ICC, 127  poses an example of this. The legal rules do not 
consider the ‘incidental’ deprivation of these commodities a crime. Only when the civilian 
population is intently denied these necessities as a part of a genocidal plan, a war crime or a crime 
against humanity, is the situation addressed as an international crime, worthy of a global cry of 
outrage.128 
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Another example of the private/public distinction relevant to international criminal law is provided 
by Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, and concerns the definition of the crime of torture. In the 
Rome Statute, torture is  a category  of war-crimes, as well as a crime against humanity when 
committed as a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.129  The authors 
interpret torture as a crime imagined to have take place in the public sphere, an infringement on the 
civil and political rights of the victim,130  thus leaving structural and domestic violence outside the 
prohibition.131  Yet whereas the Convention Against Torture (the object of scrutiny of Charlesworth, 
Chinkin and Wright) requires that the suffering imposed on the victim be inflicted for a certain 
purpose by a public official (or at least with his or hers acquiescence),132 the ‘Elements of Crimes’-
document, which fleshes out the definition of the crimes of the Rome Statute, expressly  states that 
no such purpose needs to be established to prove the crime of torture.133 A potential veer away from 
the arbitrary distinction of public and private in international criminal law. 
3.3.3.	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  individual
International criminal law further focuses on individuals, rather than groups or political and 
economic structures, in deciding on responsibility  for harm done. To the mind of Antonio Cassese, 
this is one of the most prominent merits of the paradigm, as it exonerates the (innocent) collective 
and targets the single perpetrators.134  Cassese emphasises that individual criminal responsibility 
arises when a person has committed a delict intently (or through culpable negligence).135  Osiel 
notes that this is a narrow take on causation, compared to the social-sciences, where the scope of 
responsibility is cast significantly  wider.136 However, the demand for foreseeability in criminal law 
requires that it be predictable just what  behaviour renders criminal responsibility. This principle is 
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common to national and international criminal law alike. However, in the latter paradigm, the focus 
on individual perpetrators is not only  a matter of adhering to the rule of law. The case can also be 
made that it is an expression of a fairly limited understanding of conflicts and violence. 
Payam Akhavan’s account of the virtues of the judicial intervention in the conflicts of Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia summarises very well the logic to the focus on individual perpetrators: ”At a 
volatile transition stage, the calculated manipulation of fears and tensions unleashed a self-
perpetuating spiral of violence in which thousands of citizens became the unwitting instrument of 
unscrupulous political elites questing after supremacy.”137  This conflict analysis, where individuals 
are considered the root cause of the mass-atrocities unleashed, leads to the suggested remedy: 
Akhavan strongly advocates the apprehending and removal of the responsible leaders from 
positions of power. These individuals must then be stigmatised and their leadership undermined 
through criminal prosecutions and convictions.138  On a global scale the intended effect is to instil 
into world leaders a fear of accountability, thus preventing the reoccurrence of international 
crimes.139
The focus on the individual perpetrators however obscures from view structural violence, where 
there is no direct personal perpetrator (and no military force is involved) but where structural 
inequalities such as the uneven distribution of global resources reaps significant numbers of 
casualties around the globe.140  Galtung states that”[e]thical systems directed against intended 
violence will easily fail to capture structural violence in their nets – and may hence be catching the 
small fry and letting the big fish loose.”141 
Another issue related to the focus on individual perpetrators, which is particularly problematic in 
the context of international criminal law, is the notion of the ‘free will’ of the perpetrator. Payam 
Akhavan appears to advocate the prosecution of senior government officials, rather than the ‘dirty 
hands’ or ‘trigger pullers’ on the ground. He views it as problematic to punish the criminal actions 
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of a people who’s morality  has been ’inverted’ so that it  is commonly believed that the crimes 
committed are in fact not crimes at all, but heroic acts. Moral choice, Akhavan notes, may in many 
instances not have been available at all.142  Ruti Teitel, however, avoids the distinction between 
‘masterminds’ and ‘trigger-pullers‘ and argues that the historical record to be derived from a 
criminal trial conveys the ”[k]nowledge, choice and agency”143 of the perpetrator, thus informing a 
society of individual responsibility and the possibility of change.144 
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3.4.	  Principles	  of	  jus7ce,	  procedure	  and	  evidence	  at	  the	  interna7onal	  tribunals
This section considers the general principles of international criminal law, as they have been applied 
by the international tribunals and thus shaped the ‘truth’ that is created and discovered by them. 
	   3.4.1.	  Nullum	  crimen	  sine	  lege
The latin maxim nullum crimen sine lege is often referred to as the rule of legality: no crime 
without law.145  The rule demands for the penal law rule to be clear and unambiguous, as well as 
publicly promulgated prior to the criminal act. Re-phrased as a prohibition: no one may be held 
criminally accountable for an act or omission that was not considered a crime at the time of its 
commission.146  The Rome Statute declares in its article 22 that the ICC shall conduct its work 
faithful to these rules.147 It follows from this principle that the prosecutor will investigate only such 
behavior that prima facie meets the elements of the crime, and will before the court interpret his or 
her findings as corresponding to these elements.148 
In the context of international criminal law, the legality principle determines the scope of the 
prosecutor’s investigation and accordingly  has a decisive affect on the historical narrative that is 
conveyed by the trial. Examples of the implications of the principle are plentiful. It may cause the 
court to essentially disregard circumstances that  may be irrelevant to the issue of individual guilt or 
innocence, yet which arguably provide a backdrop without which the commission of the crime 
cannot be understood.	   Accordingly, the first  judgement delivered by  the International Criminal 
Court, in which Tomas Lubanga Dyilo was found guilty of conscription and enlistment of child-
soldiers,149 recognises the civil war in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the 
DRC) as having its origin in ”ethnic tensions and competition for resources”150. Yet the extent to 
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which the conflict has been exacerbated and perpetuated by  the battle over the natural resources of 
the DRC is doubtlessly not done justice in the judgement. Nor is the extent to which the trade of 
these resources has financed the conflict itself.151 The focus of the judgement is on the elements of 
the crime and the evidence of Lubanga’s personal control over the commission of the crime. Root 
causes to the conflict, such as ethnic tensions or shady diamond trade are given little room in the 
narrative of Lubanga’s individual criminal guilt.  
A contrast to the above example of the issues related to the narrow focus of criminal law is provided 
by Richard Ashby Wilson, who advocates international trials as conveyors of full-bodied accounts 
about the past. He argues that the international crimes in and of themselves demand the 
contextualisation of the criminal act  and provides his reader with examples from the rich case law 
of the ICTY. Reading the Tadic judgement,152 he emphasises how the prosecutor had to provide the 
court with evidence of a widespread and systematic attack on the Bosnian Muslims, prove 
knowledge on the side of the perpetrator of this attack, as well as of the nexus between the mass-
orchestrated persecution and his individual crime.153   Similarly, in the Krstic judgement,154  Ashby 
Wilson highlights how the count of genocide demanded substantial forensic evidence on the mass 
killings in Srebrenica and furthermore required the prosecution to establish the killings as a part of a 
campaign of violence directed as the Bosnian Muslims in the area.155 In the context of international 
criminal law, the legality principle thus appears to simultaneously limits and extends the scope of 
the judicial inquiry.  
3.4.2.	  Collec7ve	  crime	  and	  individual	  guilt
The inquiry  into the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator also requires consideration 
of the broader context of the crime. Tieger and Shin note:”[in] criminal litigation in a post-conflict 
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environment – [...] almost any essential fact to be proven to establish individual guilt is likely to be 
laden with historical significance”156. 
International criminal law grapples with situations of collective crime, where a group  of 
perpetrators concertedly carry out a criminalised act, and it’s difficult to determine more specifically 
’who contributed in what way’. It is also faced with the issue of how to hold a person principally 
responsible for a crime that he or she did not physically  commit, but indeed directed or controlled 
as a so-called ‘mastermind’ of the crime. The creative innovation of the ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’ 
doctrine at  the ad hoc tribunals arguably attempts to deal with both these issues. According to the 
doctrine, a person may be criminally  liable for the actions of his or her fellow compatriots, if in the 
context of the realisation of a joint  criminal enterprise, a crime is committed by a third person, as a 
logical extension of the criminal plans of the group.157  Whereas the ‘Joint  Criminal Enterprise’ 
doctrine has proven useful to frame the criminal responsibility of political and military  leaders, it 
has been criticised as requiring inquiry into matters that are not de jure on trial.158
It appears that the ICC has chosen a more restrictive interpretation of the notion of ‘commission’ of 
a crime, utilising the German ‘control over the crime’ doctrine. In this structured way of ascribing 
criminal guilt, the court needs to establish a line of causation between the crime and the alleged 
perpetrator.159  As the court primarily targets high level criminals, this causal line needs to connect 
the ‘masterminds’ to the ‘dirty hands’. The construct of this causal line has, in the emerging 
jurisprudence of the ICC, meant the establishment of criminal guilt by co-perpetratorship or 
indirect-perpetratorship. Much like the extensive inquiries associated with the ‘Joint Criminal 
Enterprise’ doctrine, these modes of criminal liability  still require an in-depth analysis of the greater 
context in which the crime was committed. 
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The recently adjudicated Lubanga-case is an example of such an analysis. In this case, Trial 
Chamber I of the ICC considered evidence ranging from the creation and motivations of the Union 
des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and the Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC), 
their power-structures and actions.160  The Trial Chamber found that Lubanga had acted as the 
President of the UPC and as the Commander in Chief of the FPLC, wielding ‘ultimate control’ over 
these organisations.161 This position, along with the actions taken by the accused to encourage and 
facilitate the recruitment of child soldiers allowed the court to conclude that he had made an 
essential contribution to the commission of the crimes for which he was charged.162  Lubanga was 
accordingly found guilty of conscripting and enlisting child-soldiers.163    
3.4.3.	  Procedure	  and	  evidence	  
Rules on procedure and evidence, internal to the conduct of the trial itself may  at first glance carry 
little relevance in a study on the historical narrative produced by the international tribunals. At a 
second look, a conclusion to the contrary can be made. Whereas the State Parties to the ICC have 
provided the court with a substantial document on ‘Rules on Procedure and Evidence’, 164  the UN 
tribunals were left  with an open provision leaving it up the discretion of their judges to establish 
such rules.165  The rules on procedure and evidence thus vary in number, detail and scope between 
the tribunals. They however share common features regulating the conduct of investigations and 
trials, which influence the narrative of history that will be provided by the same. 
Evidence
William Schabas argues that the approach taken by the UN tribunals on the production and 
presentation of evidence resembles the adversarial common law model, where the parties are given 
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significant freedom as to what evidence they choose to produce.166  To balance this autonomy, the 
courts are however provided with the possibility to proprio motu request  the production of 
evidence, as well as to request the appearance of a witness.167  The Rome Statute departs from the 
same principle of party autonomy, yet provides the ICC Chambers with the mandate to adjure the 
production of such evidence that it ”[c]onsiders necessary for the determination of truth”168. 
Incumbent upon the ICC Prosecutor is furthermore the duty to investigate incriminating and 
exculpatory  evidence alike.169  This principle arguably  broadens the scope of the evidence produced 
by the Prosecutor, yet the principle is most likely aimed at realising the rights of the accused, rather 
than to achieve a more full-bodied historical record. 
Furthermore, compared to the intricate common law rules and principles governing the 
admissibility of evidence, primarily aimed at providing a framework for lay juries, the same rules 
governing the work of the international tribunals are noticeably lenient.170  Rather than rendering 
certain categories of evidence prima facie inadmissible, the rules on evidence emphasise the 
authority of the judges to assess the evidentiary value of the evidence presented to them.171 
Citing case law from the ICTY, Schabas also establishes that the standard of proof required for a 
conviction at  the UN tribunals is governed by the common law maxim ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’.172  This is a high threshold of proof, as emphasized by the ICTY Trial Chamber:”[n]ot even 
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the gravest of suspicions can establish proof beyond reasonable doubt”173, an evidentiary standard 
shared by the ICC.174 
The judgement’s lack of ambiguity 
The either/or character of criminal law, whereby  two competing narratives are positioned against 
each other in a battle that only one can win, stands in stark contrast  to the organic ambiguity of 
history that  may be revealed by  other fact-finding bodies such as truth commissions.175  There is 
however little room for ambiguity in a judgement establishing whether the indicted person is found 
guilty or not guilty of the charges. Interestingly  enough (and perhaps mindful of its truth-telling 
function), in acquitting Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui of the charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, the ICC chose to comment on this circumstance. In a press release to be found on the 
webpage of the court, the judgement is summarised, including its exposition on the relation between 
the final verdict and its relation to the truth about past events in the DRC. In excerpt: 
”The Chamber emphasised, however, that the approach it adopted does not 
mean that, in its opinion, no crimes were committed in Bogoro on 24 
February 2003, nor does it question what the people of this community have 
suffered on that day. The Chamber also emphasised that the fact of deciding 
that an accused is not guilty does not necessarily mean that the Chamber 
finds him innocent. Such a decision simply demonstrates that, given the 
standard of proof, the evidence presented to support his guilt has not 
allowed the Chamber to form a conviction ’beyond reasonable doubt’.”176
Plea bargaining
Related to the issue of establishing the truth about the past in the final judgement is the 
controversial practice of ‘plea bargaining’ and guilty pleas submitted by the accused at the ad hoc 
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tribunals.177 The matter is contentious particularly because of concerns that this practice will impair 
the creation of a historical record and ultimately  the process of reconciliation, as it will shorten the 
proceedings and limit the scope of investigations.178  So-called ‘charge bargaining‘, where the 
accused admits to the commission of one crime in exchange for the prosecutor to drop other charges 
has been questioned as a practice contrary  to the victim’s as well as societies right to truth.179 The 
case has however been made to the contrary. It is held that plea agreements facilitate the essential 
contribution of the perspective of the perpetrator to the establishment of the truth about the past, 
thus allowing for a more comprehensive account of the past to be presented at the trial.180  The 
acknowledgement of guilt on the side of the perpetrator is furthermore considered to further the 
goal of bringing closure to victims and achieving a lasting peace.181  Following the statements made 
by the former President of the Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic, where she recanted her admission 
of guilt, as well as her expressed feelings of remorse originally  expressed before the ICTY,182  the 
latter ambition has however been revealed as rather fragile. 
In the ICC system, the Rome Statute acknowledges the possibility of an admission of guilt, yet 
demands that the court convicts the accused of the crime only  when it is satisfied that the plea, 
alongside the evidence presented, suffices to establish the guilt of the accused.183  In the interest  of 
justice, particularly  considering the interest  of the victims, the court may request further evidence 
and testimony be given to produce a more ‘complete’ presentation of the case.184 
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3.5.	  	  The	  truth,	  the	  trial	  and	  the	  template
In the introductory part to this chapter, the right to truth is said to provide a template with which the 
historical narrative produced at the international tribunals can be evaluated. It  is suggested that the 
focal point of such a review should be the collective right to truth and the question it provokes: do 
the tribunals in their work produce such information about the crimes they are set to adjudicate, that 
enables a democratic society to prevent future crime, thus furthering reconciliation, peace and 
security?
The circumstances, the causes and conditions pertaining to the commission of international crimes 
are arguably investigated at the tribunals. The definition of the crimes demand far-reaching 
investigations into the character of conflicts, into the scale and systematics of the persecution 
etcetera. The objective of the tribunals, to target primarily high-level perpetrators also extends the 
scope and character of the investigations (compared to most domestic criminal law proceedings). 
The principle of legality  however also limits the scope of the historical narrative, marginalising the 
importance of the circumstances in which the crime took place. Furthermore the focus on individual 
perpetrators contributes (for good or bad) to the exoneration of the collective. 
Perhaps, the issue of the historical narrative produced at the international tribunals relates not so 
much to what  it says, but what it leaves unsaid. The international criminal law paradigm appears 
oblivious to the debate pertaining to the urgency of addressing root-causes to violence and conflict. 
This is particularly evident  in the sketch of the ’politics of international criminal law’.  Mindful of 
the critics of the limited scope of transitional justice mechanisms, who receive backing from the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, this is problematic, considering that international criminal 
trials aim at deterrence and prevention of future atrocities. The problem – if one adheres to the 
functional perspective of the right to truth and the principle of non-repetition – relates to the way in 
which the affected societies are not necessarily aided in the difficult task of analysing what ’went 
wrong’ in the past. They merely  receive a narrative of individual guilt or innocence. To this end the 
problem is also one of the possible obstruction of recovery and remedy, as will be elaborated upon 
in the next chapter. 
Dermot Groome’s suggestion that a human rights body might demand a referral of a case to the ICC 
in the interest of realising the right to truth accordingly appears to be based on a halting analysis of 
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the scope of the norm. Whereas the individual right to truth may indeed be vindicated by courtroom 
proceedings, considering the collective right to truth, the matter is not equally clear cut. 
In the next chapter, utilising the concept of ideology, the political nature of judicial history-writing 
is further investigated. If not  necessarily  in providing a comprehensive explanation to the causes 
and conditions pertaining to the commission of crime, wherein does the utility  of the truth 
discovered in the courtroom really lie? 
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4.	  Truth,	  jus7ce	  and	  ideology
4.1.	  A	  cri7que	  of	  ideology
What is ideology? The term has been mentioned at various points in the text without being defined. 
For the purpose of this section it  is necessary to expand on the concept. Terry Eagleton argues that 
ideology can be understood in a narrow sense and in a wider sense. The wider definition views 
ideology as a set  of ideas explaining and defending ends and means of political action.185  The 
narrower sense of the term considers the study  of ideology  to focus on strategies by which a 
”[d]ominant power may legitimize itself”186. In another, more explicit  Marxian analysis of the 
functions of ideology, it has been defined as the ”[m]ystificatory processes whereby social reality 
reproduces itself”187. 
In the introductory chapter to the dissertation, it is suggested that whatever understanding of past 
crimes a society shares, it will shape the legal response to these crimes. This response will then 
reinforce and recreate the narrative of history that spurred the legal reaction in the first place (see 
section 1.2.3.). The previous chapter qualified this argument in the context of international criminal 
law. A certain analysis of the cause of a conflict, of who wields control over a crime, or indeed what 
action or omission should be qualified as a crime in the first  place, will influence the recommended 
remedy. In this case, the remedy of conducting a trial will then arguably reinforce the initial 
analysis, by way of the narrative of history that it will inevitably (re-)produce. The notion of 
ideology is useful to this end because it  provides a conceptual frame in which it  is possible to 
understand the project of international criminal justice as intrinsically political – not only in its 
overt effects, but also in its implications. Thus, the international criminal trials can be understood as 
agents of ideology, by way of the historical narrative that they produce and sustain.
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4.1.1.	  The	  interna7onal	  criminal	  trial’s	  claim	  to	  universal	  validity	  and	  relevance:	  the	  
process	  of	  ideology
”Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which 
produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it.”188
Analysing the above exposé of the creation of a historical narrative at the international tribunals, it 
becomes apparent that international criminal law is influenced by a set of ideas that has shaped the 
trajectory of the paradigm: liberalism, individualism and the rule of law all legitimise the criminal 
trial as a response to grave violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
International criminal law is accordingly shaped by a political ideology that favours a certain 
understanding of the past. The validity of this narrative is dependent on the political inclination of 
the addressee to the narrative. 
In the wider sense of ideology, the trial can be considered to be an expression of the ideas 
underlying the paradigm. Applied to the purported truth-telling function of the trial, it reveals the 
limits to the historical narrative that can be derived from the work of the tribunals as political. At 
worst, the issue to be identified by this analysis is epistemological; perhaps this political narrative, 
in its focus and blind-spots, deviates too extensively from ‘what really  happened’, turning claims of 
truth-discovery and justice into a travesty.
The above reiterated, ‘neutral’ account of the process of ideology in international criminal law 
considers the process to be an operation that occurs in the space between the political idea and the 
law. It is a one-way street, whereby the law and its mechanisms are influenced by politics. The 
critical, narrow, conception of the process of ideology, however, understands this process as a 
circular operation,189  and instead of being bothered by epistemology, it focuses on the mysterious 
way in which ideology sustains the status quo or, indeed, privilege.190  The critical inquiry  into the 
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process of ideology thus relates to the way in which a certain state of affairs is made to appear 
natural and how a certain set of ideas is made to seem universally relevant.191 
An indication of how the process of ideology  may work in the rhetoric surrounding the project of 
international criminal justice can be found in section 3.3.1. of this dissertation. Here, Antonio 
Cassese is quoted stating that the behaviour framed as international crime in the paradigm of 
international criminal law, is behaviour which lies in the interest of all humankind to repress – 
certainly a claim to universal relevance. In this perspective, the limits of the paradigm, exempting 
from redress grievances experienced by  civilians in conflict, or harm caused by multi-national 
companies, appear neutral, instead of political. The critical conception of ideology further begs the 
question: who benefits from this limit? 
The narrative of history  produced by the trials is furthermore a vivid example of the circular 
character of the process of ideology. The select inquiry  into the past prescribed by international 
criminal law will arguably enforce the understanding of history that brought about the trial as a 
response to grave human rights violations in the first place. When the ‘problem’ is framed as 
military violence, ordered and committed by individuals, then a trial addressing this problem as a 
crime appears as a rational ‘solution’.192  The trial will then arguably  act as an agent  of ideology, 
making this conflict analysis universally  applicable, this understanding of the relevance of 
individual agency appear natural. 
4.1.2.	  The	  determined	  aspect	  of	  history	  obscured	  in	  the	  ideology	  of	  con7ngency	  of	  
interna7onal	  criminal	  law	  –	  the	  trial	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  ideology
”Justice demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended and judged, and 
that all the other questions of seemingly greater import - of ”How could it 
happen” and ” Why did it happen?”, of ”Why the Jews?” and ”Why the 
Germans?”, of ”What was the role of other nations?” and ”What was the 
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extent of co-responsibility on the side of the Allies?” [...] - be left in 
abeyance. Justice insists on the importance of Adolf Eichmann [...]”193
”It reduces the complexity and scale of multiple responsibilities to a mere 
background”194 
Koskenniemi notes that when one attempts to understand the commission of grave violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law, it varies depending on the situation whether one is 
best off focusing on individual guilt  or structural causes.195  In other words, no one perspective is 
prima facie false, and credible cases have been made to the advantage of either in the process of 
arriving at a historical truth. 
As mentioned above, the wider sense of ideology  provides a useful concept to understand the 
epistemological controversy related to the historical narrative provided by the international 
tribunals. In it’s core it relates to the political nature of the historical analysis provided by the 
paradigm. Ruti Teitel is arguably  a supporter of this ideology, and emphasises the emancipatory 
potential of the criminal trial and its historical narrative, wherein the agency (and implicitly  control) 
of the individual perpetrator is conveyed.196  Implicit in this argument is her support for this 
particular analysis of the past, not only  because of the purported positive effect of emancipation, but 
also because she believes this narrative to be in fact true. Teitel’s views however are not 
uncontroversial and Immi Tallgren describes the conduct of trials involved with international 
criminal justice as a secular act of faith, obscuring rather than discovering the truth: 
”The seemingly unambiguous notions of innocence and guilt create 
consoling patterns of causality in the chaos of intertwined problems of 
social, political, and economic deprivation surrounding the violence. 
Thereby international criminal law seems to make comprehensible the 
incomprehensible.”197 
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Tallgren also indicates that this is a not wholly innocent project. The rationalisation and construct of 
causation in the paradigm, as well as the focus of the international tribunals on state crime and 
individual guilt could be interpreted as a politically  convenient diversion from the fundamental 
inequalities and injustices of the world.198 Tallgren’s critique of the historical narrative produced by 
international criminal law of course relates to the Marxist understanding of ideology as a 
conservatory process, whereby the status quo of social and economic inequality is maintained.199 
Further support as to the truthfulness of the historical narrative provided by the international 
tribunals is offered by Richard Ashby  Wilson. He applauds the emphasis put on the historical 
backdrop  to the Yugoslavian conflict  presented in the Tadic judgement of 1996, yet refers to it  as an 
account particularly laudable for its lack of deterministic tendencies: 
”Up until 1988, the Judgment's history serves as a kind of background, a 
setting which allows us to understand the conflict in Bosnia more 
profoundly. It projects a legacy, but not a deterministic one, and not a set of 
conditions which caused the genocide in Bosnia. Nowhere in this section of 
the Judgement does the language suggest causal relations or instigating 
events or factors. Threats are identified, but they remain only threats. The 
Judgment's historical account does not lead inexorably towards ethnic 
cleansing and war, since other outcomes were possible. This is not a tractor 
narrative which Bosnians could not escape, but more the backdrop to a 
tragic play.”200 
Ashby Wilson thus commends the judgement for asserting the contingent nature of history, for 
correctly considering the long lasting ethnic tensions in the former Yugoslavia, spurred on by the 
political instability, and the deteriorating socio-economic situation of the civilian population, as a 
mere background to the conflict.201  Susan Marks has however criticised this precise perspective on 
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history commonly  taken on by international lawyers, stating that contingency, or as she puts it  ‘false 
contingency’, is false because it  obscures necessity.202  Necessity being the perspective on history 
that understands historical processes as shaped by  limitations, coercion and tendencies.203  Utilising 
her critique, the contingent perspective on history  represented in the Tadic judgement is problematic 
because it complicates the understanding of historical necessity, represented in the above recognised 
elements of social, economic and political insecurity contributing to the occurrence of international 
crime. 
4.1.3.	  The	  narra7ve	  of	  interna7onal	  criminal	  law	  and	  the	  promise	  of	  non-­‐repe77on
Marks’ hesitation concerning the epistemological issue of truth and history  is particularly 
interesting when considering Koskenniemi’s reflection on his own statement on how to understand 
the commission of some particularly heinous crimes, referred to above. As mentioned, he considers 
neither an inquiry focusing on the guilt of individual perpetrators, nor an investigation into 
structural root-causes to crime, as a universal method of establishing the ‘real’, historical truth. 
Rather, Koskenniemi argues that the historical situation should dictate the relevant questions to be 
asked when one seeks the truth about the past.  Following this assertion, he notes that  the conduct of 
a criminal trial is sometimes highly problematic because of its prima facie orientation towards 
individual responsibility. Because of this, the trial may obstruct the process of discovering the 
historical truth, rather than facilitating it.204  It follows that the orientation of the international 
tribunals towards contingency and individual responsibility, instead of necessity and structural 
causes to crime, will shape the historical narrative produced by their trials. According to 
Koskenniemi’s line of thought, this narrative will be more or less ‘true’, dependent on the situation. 
It will, however, consistently undermine and falsify the structural perspective on the commission of 
international crime. 
The reflection of Koskenniemi described above indeed relates to the matter of the utility of the 
particular narrative of the past that is created at the international tribunals. Throughout the 
dissertation, this utility  has been evaluated with the right to truth and its stipulations in sight. On 
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that note it is interesting to remember how above it is held that the promise of the collective right to 
truth is intricately related to the promise of non-repetition. Implicitly, the collective right to truth 
appears to relate to the equation of remedy: set  adequate diagnosis => prescribe cure. The norm 
requires information that enables an understanding of past crimes so that these can be prevented in 
the future. A simple manoeuvre in theory, more complex in practice. An example of this is provided 
by Mahmood Mamdani, who provides an unforgiving account of the work of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He argues that the narrow scope of the Commission’s 
inquiry, provided an analysis of the crimes of Apartheid that was detrimental to achieving national 
unity  and reconciliation, contrary  to its purported goals.205  Mamdani’s critique is arguably relevant 
as a counterpose to the claim that  international criminal justice may prevent future crime by way of 
providing a ‘neutral’ and ‘correct’ account of the past. 
Mamdani stresses that the time limit set  on the investigations at the Commission did not target the 
actual practice of apartheid, but rather the repercussions affecting those challenging it.206  The 
limited definition of a ‘gross violation of human rights’, according to which only  political violence 
in the shape of ’killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment’ fell under the investigatory 
mandate of the Commission furthermore enhanced this aspect.207  Mamdani asserts: ”[t]he 
Commission acknowledged only those violations suffered by political activists or state agents. It 
consequently ignored apartheid as experienced by the broad masses of the people of South 
Africa.”208  Finally, Mamdani draws attention to the paradox that was the consequent of these 
limitations: while the violence of the discriminatory practices of Apartheid targeted groups rather 
than individuals, the reparations recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
focused on individual victims, rather than whole communities.209 
Mamdani’s account of the work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission can 
thus be understood as an example of the consequences of an all too limited analysis of past crimes 
and grievances: it  will lead to a distorted historical narrative and consequently undermine the 
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possibility of an adequate remedy. This understanding is corroborated by  Marks, who notes that as 
the crime of Apartheid predominantly consists of forceful, discriminatory  redistribution of resources 
and power, the choice of remedy should naturally  be social justice directed at affected groups.210 Yet 
because of the incapability of the Commission to address the way in which one group in the South 
African society had ”[p]rospered at the expense of another”211, this remedy  was never 
proscribed.212 
Resembling Mamdani’s and Marks’ review of the issues related to an all-too narrow definition of 
the crime of apartheid in South Africa, is Fletcher and Weinstein’s analysis of the possibilities and 
limits to the contribution of criminal justice to reconciliation (and implicitly non-repetition). They 
argue that legal intervention is insufficient as a response to situations of mass-violence for two 
reasons. To their minds, criminal justice fails to take into account the guilt of the bystanders and the 
facilitators of the violence, thus contributing to a ”[m]yth of collective innocence”213. Perhaps more 
critically, they  suggest that it may hamper social reconstruction, because it fails to ”[a]ddress the 
social phenomena that sabotage individual will during periods of collective violence.”214 Fletcher 
and Weinstein aver that criminal trials are insufficient as a mean to achieve reconciliation, because 
they  do not  recognise the importance of economic, social and political instability  as a context 
providing for the social breakdown in which war or mass violence occur. They assert that  for a 
worthwhile social rebuilding to take place, these issues must be identified and dealt with.215 
Furthermore, the authors hold that when the collective responsibility of so-called bystanders is not 
attended to (such as in criminal trials with their focus on individual accountability), this lacunae in 
a post-conflict narrative may lead to future violence.216
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  4.2.	  On	  law	  and	  vocabulary:	  ‘individual	  accountability’	  and	  	  ’fact-­‐ﬁnding’	  instead	  of	  
‘jus7ce’	  and	  ‘truth’	  as	  adequate	  terminology	  in	  interna7onal	  criminal	  law
Fletcher and Weinstein conclude that the utility of the international trials, as well as of national 
trials in a country coming to terms with a history of mass-violence and oppression, is to hold 
individuals accountable for their acts. Such accountability is particularly important insofar as it 
establishes not only guilt and innocence in relation to past crimes, but because the state through the 
trials asserts a boundary between acceptable behavior and criminal behavior.217
Indeed, criminal prosecutions have an important role to play in a post-conflict society. The nature of 
this role is however contentious. Arendt states that the criminal tribunal ”speaks with an authority 
whose weight depends upon its limitation”218. Admittedly, in the case of Adolf Eichmann, the issue 
at hand was not the character of the historical record which could be derived from the judicial 
process itself, but rather the fact that the trial was actively used as a method of history writing by 
the Israeli government. Yet Arendt’s words appear pertinent still, when addressing the matter of the 
way the international trials may act as agents of ideology.  It is held that  the universal relevance of 
international criminal law can be questioned. The paradigm does not address all ills of mankind and 
it does not always sufficiently explain the causes pertaining to the commission of the crimes it does 
tackle. Yet in asserting the opposite, the trial becomes a silent agent of a liberal ideology, a process 
that may influence the utility of the trial itself. 
It is worth mentioning (again) that while geared towards the prosecution of individuals guilty  of a 
limited group of crimes, the value of the contemporary international tribunals is commonly asserted 
with reference to goals way beyond the point of individual accountability. The ICTR Statute views 
the court as an agent of reconciliation.219  Similarly, the ICTY Statute holds that the prosecution of 
individuals guilty of grave crimes in the former Yugoslavia will bring justice and peace to the warn-
torn societies.220  Indeed, the Rome Statute of the ICC is no different and connects the work of the 
court with the furtherance of peace and security in the world.221 Yet these far-reaching promises fall 
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short of explaining more precisely  how these effects are meant to come about. In this void, claims 
have been made about  the historical narrative produced at the tribunals, and its relevance to a 
society affected by  grave crimes. The trials have been considered to be didactic tools, enlightening 
post-conflict societies on the nature of crime and conflict.222  The revelation of the truth about past 
crimes, in combination with their public condemnation has furthermore been held to have a 
deterrent effect, preventing future atrocities.223  The case has however been made to the contrary, 
with critical voices raised against the trials simplifications of guilt and causation which may 
potentially obscure perspectives of root-causes to violence, paramount to the understanding of the 
necessary  context to crime.224 To an extent, the controversies related to the effects of the historical 
narrative produced at the international tribunals is arguably related to vocabulary. 
International criminal justice is a political project. The historical narrative that is produced at the 
international tribunals is not neutral, it  is shaped by a liberal ideology. The proponents of the utility 
of this narrative nevertheless make their case in the language of ‘truth’ and ‘justice’, two terms 
claiming neutrality and universal relevance. By framing the work of the tribunals in this way, the 
ideological character of the trials, as well as of the historical narrative they produce, is obscured. 
Above, this is described as a process of ideology, whereby certain values are made to seem 
universal or natural. It  can be argued that in the interest of guaranteeing the non-repetition of 
international crime, this vocabulary should be modified to the more limited terms of ‘individual 
accountability’ and fact-finding’. 
Should the failure to provide societies scourged by conflict and mass violence be considered a 
short-coming of the international trials, perhaps even bringing into question the legitimacy of the 
international criminal justice project? Arendt would answer this question in the negative. Rather, 
she celebrates the limits to the criminal law paradigm, and the authority they render the 
judgement.225  It follows from the third chapter of this dissertation that the international criminal 
trials focus on fact-finding and individual accountability. Following Arendt’s line of thought, the 
greatness of the trials lies in the vast body of evidence produced in the process of establishing the 
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224 Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials. Page 15. 
225 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem : a report on the banality of evil. Page 253. 
commission of a number of heinous acts, as well as with establishment of individual criminal guilt 
of the indicted person. Indeed, Fletcher and Weinstein assert that while criminal justice should not 
be considered a sufficient remedy in and of itself to a situation of mass violence, it may play an 
important role in its own right.226 
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5.	  Concluding	  remarks:	  admiSng	  one’s	  limits	  and	  establishing	  one’s	  
authority
When claims are made as to the relevance of the truth produced in the courtroom to matters beyond 
the question of establishing individual guilt, the narrow scope of the criminal law narrative becomes 
problematic. To claim that a trial can provide a comprehensive record of history, or that it  is well 
suited to provide a conflict-analysis to a people in dire need of an explanation of the reasons for its 
victimisation, is arguably to make a political claim. Yet, by  using the vocabulary  of ‘truth’ and 
‘justice’, the political nature of this claim is distorted. In turn, this assertion will appear natural, and 
any other explanation on why mass-violence occurs, other theories of causation and so forth, will 
appear political. This is the work of ideology and it is troublesome for two reasons: 1) It  will distort 
the limits to the trial, and the therewith associated benefits of a meticulous inquiry into the 
responsibility of an individual for the commission of very grave crimes. 2) It  will undermine any 
historical analysis based on a structural understanding of violence and oppression, taking no 
account of the fact that whereas some conflicts and crime are best understood as the result of 
individual choice and agency, others are not. 
It is thus argued that admitting one’s limits is necessary  to establish one’s authority. Cherif 
Bassiouni holds: 
“The ICC will not be a panacea for all the ills of humankind. It will not 
eliminate conflicts, nor return victims to life, or restore survivors to their 
prior conditions of well-being and it will not bring all perpetrators of major 
crimes to justice. But it can help avoid some conflicts, prevent some 
victimization, and bring to justice some of the perpetrators of these crimes. 
In so doing, the ICC will strengthen world order and contribute to world 
peace and security. ”227
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